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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Dwight Earl Reber appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred by failing to
rule on his motion to appoint conflict counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2001, Mr. Reber was found guilty of lewd conduct tih a minor under the age of
sixteen and the district court imposed a unified sentence of sixteen years, with four
years fixed.

(R., p.1.) In 2012, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., p.2.) Mr. Reber asserted 1) the district court failed to allow testimony of defense
witnesses; 2) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; 3) the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict; and 4) counsel was ineffective. (R., p.2.) Regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Reber asserted that counsel failed to call certain
witnesses, failed to make timely objections, and failed to spend adequate time with him
to prepare for trial.

(R., p.2.) He further elaborated that counsel failed to investigate

witnesses that could verify his innocence, failed to present favorable evidence at trial,
namely Mr. Reber's clothing, falied to make objections to the prosecutor's improper
arguments and examination of witnesses, and failed to file for a change of venue.
(R., pp.2-3.)
(R., p.6.)

The State filed an answer, asserting that the petition was untimely.

The State then filed a motion for summary dismissal on the same basis.

(Augmentation.)
Mr. Reber then filed a pro se motion to amend the petition along with a
supporting affidavit. (Augmentation.) In this motion he requested the ability to amend
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to

demonstrate

equitable

tolling,

actual

innocence,

and

reversible

error.

(Augmentation.) In the affidavit, Mr. Reber asserted that his court-appointed counsel
was not heeding his requests or reviewing exculpatory documents and he had been
obstructed from pursuing legal remedies while incarcerated. (Augmentation.)
Counsel for Mr. Reber then filed a brief in support of the petition for postconviction relief, asserting that newly discovered evidence of an alibi defense should toll
the statute of limitations. (R., p.15.) Specifically, counsel for Mr. Reber asserted that, "it
is anticipated at the hearing ... that Mr. Reber and perhaps a Mr. William Bertram will
testify that Mr. Reber was at work in another State at the time of the alleged incidences
what formed the basis for the State's prosecution of Mr. Reber. This testimony would
amount to newly discovered evidence." (R., p.13.) Counsel for Mr. Reber submitted no
evidence from Mr. Bertram.
The State responded, asserting that the statement in the brief, "which is not
verified," provided no discussion as to how this evidence was nearly discovered and not
known thirteen years prior. (R., p.17.) Further, the State asserted that no reason had
been given by Mr. Reber as to why his claims were not raised in his first petition for
post-conviction relief in 2002. (R., p.18.)
Mr. Reber then filed a pro se "affidavit of document concern and desire of p.c.
actual-innocence (claim) amendment." (Augmentation.) He asserted that he had been
unable to get his public defender to amend the petition to bring an "actual innocence"
claim. (Augmentation.)

Mr. Reber requested that counsel be placed with a conflict

attorney who would amend his petition. (Augmentation.)
The district court did not respond at all to Mr. Reber's pro se filings. It then filed a
notice of intent to dismiss, informing Mr. Reber of its intent to dismiss the petition as
2

untimely unless Mr. Reber explained how his evidence was newly discovered or why
the claims were not previously raised. (Augmentation.)
Mr. Reber then filed a pro se "motion to withdraw public defender and appoint
conflict counsel" and a supporting affidavit. (Augmentation.)

In the motion, Mr. Reber

asserted that counsel had refused to amend the petition, did not respond to his written
concerns, and questioned whether Mr. Reber's faith was a cult. (Augmentation.) In the
supporting affidavit, Mr. Reber averred that counsel had failed to communicate with him
over a period of six months and failed to raise the appropriate claims. (Augmentation.)
Finally, Mr. Reber filed a reply to the notice of intent to dismiss and attached
several exhibits.
(Augmentation.)

(R., p.20; Augmentation.)

He also filed a supporting affidavit.

The district court took no action with regard to these filings and

counsel for Mr. Reber did not respond to the notice of intent to dismiss.
The district court then dismissed the petition, holding that it was untimely and that
Mr. Reber had not established that any of his evidence was "newly discovered."

(R., pp.30-31; 36.) Mr. Reber then filed a prose notice of appeal. He asserts that the
district court erred by failing to rule on his motion for conflict counsel.

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err in failing to rule on Mr. Reber's motion to appoint conflict
counsel?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Failing To Rule On Mr. Reber's Motion For Conflict Counsel

A.

Introduction
Mr. Reber asserts that, once he requested that his attorney withdraw and that

conflict counsel be appointed, the court was required to inquire into the alleged conflict.
Because the district court did nothing, Mr. Reber asserts that the district court erred.

8.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Rule On Mr. Reber's Motion For Conflict
Counsel
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment and Due Process right to conflict-

free representation at trial and on appeal. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703
(2009) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)), also see Douglas v.

California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). Idaho appellate
courts have also recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel for non-frivolous
claims as opposed to a constitutionally grounded right. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 792-93 (2004); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2006); see also
I.C. § 19-852(b); I.C. § 19-4904. In this context, a frivolous action is "'not a proceeding
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own
expense."' Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679
(2001)(quoting I.C. § 19-852(b)(3))).

Ultimately, this means that, "[i]f the petitioner

'alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim,"' counsel should be appointed in
that case. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Charboneau I, 140
Idaho at 793) (emphasis added). "Therefore, the trial court should appoint counsel if the
petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a person with
adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into
5

the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007). In this case, the district court
implicitly found that Mr. Reber's petition was not frivolous because it appointed counsel.
Elsewhere, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized a statutory constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. In Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009), the
Supreme Court considered whether a criminal defendant had a protected right to the
effective assistance of counsel at Violent Sexual Predator (VSP) hearing board
determination and on appeal from that decision. Like post-conviction cases, because
the hearing and appeal were "civil in nature, there is no constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel." Id. at 833. However, because the right to counsel was provided
by statute, the Supreme Court found a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel. 1
Id. The Court concluded that because "there is a statutory right to effective assistance

of counsel" the "appropriate analysis is by reference to the well-established standards
governing such claims under the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 834.
Very recently, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that petitioners seeking postconviction relief from a death sentence have a statutory right to conflict-free counsel.
Hall v. State, 2013 WL 6225673 (Dec. 2, 2013) at *3. This right triggers the duty of the

district court to inquire into an alleged conflict of interest.

Id. at *4. While the Court

found that the statutory right to counsel arose from I.C.R. 44.2(1), because, as set forth

"This statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel." Smith v. State, 146 Idaho at 833
(quoting Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995)). Consequently, the Court
found there was no "legitimate basis" to evaluate an effective assistance of counsel
claim any differently based on whether the right to counsel was guaranteed by statute or
by the constitution. Id. at 833-34. It should also be noted that because the SAPD acts
concurrently as both appellate and post-conviction counsel, it would be almost
impossible to divide the SAPD's representation at any point in time as constitutionally
required (as on direct appeal), or statutorily mandated (during initial post-conviction).
1
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above I.C. § 19-4904 provides for a right to counsel in a non-frivolous post-conviction
proceeding, the same rationale applies in this situation.
Finally, even if there is no statutory right to counsel in non-death penalty postconviction actions, once the court appointed counsel, Mr. Reber was entitled to conflictfree counsel because, as set forth above, the appointment of counsel with a conflict of
interest violates due process. The United States Supreme Court has held that once a
state creates a right that implicates a person's liberty, the individual possessing this
right is entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and
required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U

539, 557 (1974). Therefore, once

the district court appointed counsel, that appointment was required to possess minimum
procedures to insure that the right is not arbitrary abrogated. Among those procedures
is an inquiry to determine whether appointed counsel has a conflict of interest.
That appointment of counsel carries with it the requirement that counsel meet
constitutional requirements is further illustrated by the fact that Idaho's appellate courts
have consistently held that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a
"sufficient reason" for the petitioner to raise or re-raise claims through successive
petitions for post-conviction relief. Indeed, on the issue of inadequately-raised claims,
the Court of Appeals recently held as follows:
A successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily
dismissed if the grounds for relief were finally adjudicated or waived in the
previous post-conviction proceeding. I.C. § 19-4908. Such grounds may
be re-litigated, however, if the petitioner shows sufficient reason why they
were inadequately presented in the original case. Id. Therefore, although
a claim of ineffective post-conviction counsel, standing alone, is not
grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim was not
adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the
deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient
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reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent
petition.
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). In Griffin, the
district court had summarily dismissed the petitioner's successive petition on the
following basis:

"It does not appear that any new issues have been presented ....

[T]his Court hereby notifies the above parties of its intention to dismiss the application
for post-conviction relief . . . because it is a successive application raising issues
already adjudicated which is not permitted." Griffin, 142 Idaho at 440.

Under these

circumstances (and in light of the standard articulated above), the Court of Appeals held
that the district "court's notice of intent to dismiss was insufficient or erroneous because
the court did not give proper consideration to Griffin's allegation that his first postconviction action was dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel," and it vacated the district court's dismissal order and remanded the case. Id.
at 441-42.
Thus, it is clear that a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
can present a sufficient reason to file a successive petition. The Idaho Supreme Court
agrees.

See, e.g., Palmer v. McDermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596 (1981) ("[l]neffective

assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, would warrant a finding that the
omission in the prior post-conviction proceeding of the allegations now being raised
anew by [the petitioner] was not a result of an active, knowing choice made by [the
petitioner] through his prior court-appointed attorney, and would therefore provide
sufficient reason for permitting the newly asserted allegations to be raised in the instant
petition.").

Therefore, the appointment of counsel carries with it the appointment of

constitutionally adequate, conflict-free counsel.
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The critical issue in identifying whether a conflict of interest exists lies in
determining if the interests of counsel conflict with his or her client's interest, thereby
compromising counsel's duty of loyalty. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692
(1984) (recognizing that counsel who labors under an actual conflict of interest
breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which is "perhaps the most basic of
counsel's duties."). The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
actual and theoretical conflicts of interest, finding that "'an actual conflict of interest'
meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere
theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (emphasis
in original). The Court held "an 'actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a
conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance." Id. at 172 n.5. This
Court has stated an actual conflict of interest involves counsel actively representing
conflicting interests.

See Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62 (2004) (citing State v.

Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98 (1998)). As summarized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:

In several cases in which the Supreme Court has defined the right to
conflict-free counsel, the defense attorney actively and concurrently
represented conflicting interests. In those cases, the Court created, in
effect, a distinction between an actual conflict of interest, and a mere
hypothetical one .... [T]he Sixth Amendment does not protect against a
"mere theoretical division of loyalties." Rather, it protects against conflicts
of interest that adversely affect counsel's performance.
Indeed, in
Mickens, the Court held that "actual conflict" is defined by the effect a
potential conflict had on counsels performance. In Mickens, the Court
explained, "[A]n actual conflict of interest [means] precisely a conflict that
affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical
division of loyalties."
Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1991) ("More than a mere
possibility of a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated

only when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of
9

interest."). Accordingly, while a trial court has a duty to inquire into a potential conflict of
interest, "a trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of speculation or
conjecture .... " People ex rel. Woodard v. Dist. Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985).
"Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60
(2003) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981 ); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466
U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). Even when the record demonstrates only the "possibility of a
conflict of interest" the court has a duty to inquire. Wood, 450 U.S. at 272. While this
duty has not been expressly extended to post-conviction proceedings, because Idaho
courts look to Sixth Amendment principles when reviewing a statutory right to counsel,
these principles include the duty to inquire.

See Smith, 146 Idaho at 833-34.

Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 88.

In this case, the district court had a duty of inquiry once Mr. Reber filed his
motion to withdraw the public defender and appoint conflict counsel. Instead, the district
court did nothing. This is clearly inadequate. Throughout his pro se filings, Mr. Reber
asserted that his appointed counsel had failed to communicate with him, failed to
amend the petition, and failed to present additional evidence to support his claims.
(Augmentation.) After Mr. Reber filed his pro se motions, counsel never responded to
the notice of intent to dismiss.
Mr. Reber raised a possible conflict of interest in that his attorney had failed to
communicate with him, failed to amend the petition and failed to present additional
evidence. When a defendant alleges a total communication breakdown, a district court
must "afford [the] defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons
in support of his motion for substitution of counsel .... " State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281,
10

285, 297 P.3d 244, 248 (2013) (quoting State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980)).
In this case, Mr. Reber made such an allegation and the district court did nothing. The
district court therefore erred.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Reber requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 2 nd day of January, 2014.

USTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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